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Abstract 
The  Byrd amendment to  US  anti-dumping  law distributes the revenue from  anti-dumping 
duties imposed on foreign firms to the domestic firms that lodged the complaint of dumping. 
When the government sets its anti-dumping duty to maximise a welfare function that attaches 
greater weight to the profits of  the domestic industry than to consumer surplus or tax revenue, 
it  is  shown that the  Byrd amendment will  lead to  lower  duties  and higher welfare  if the 
weight on the profits of  the domestic industry is sufficiently large. Also, the Byrd amendment 
makes it less likely that the anti-dumping duty will be prohibitive. 
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President  Clinton  signed  into  law  the  Byrd  amendment,  formally  known  as  the 
Continued Dumping and Subsidy Offset Act (CDSOA), on 28th October 2000. It introduced a 
system where the liquidated anti-dumping and countervailing duty revenues are distributed to 
the  'affected  domestic  producers'  who  supported  the  petition  for  the  investigation.  An 
'affected  domestic  producer'  is  defined  in  the  CDSOA  as  any  manufacturer,  producer, 
farmer, rancher, or worker representative who was a petitioner or interested party in support 
of the anti-dumping or countervailing duty investigation. They may receive a portion of the 
anti-dumping  or  countervailing  duty  revenue  to  offset  'qualifying  expenditures',  which 
includes fixed cost and some variable costs (e.g.  investment in manufacturing facilities and 
the acquisition of technology) incurred in the production of the good subject to duties. The 
major  beneficiaries  of the  CDSOA  have  been  the  ball-bearing,  steel  and  other  metals, 
household items and food (in particular, pasta) sectors. In the financial year 2001, US$230 
million was  distributed to  900  claimants;  in the financial  year 2002, US$330  million was 
distributed  to  1,200  claimants;  and  in  the  financial  year  2003  it  is  estimated  that 
US$280million  was  distributed  to  2,100  claimants.  On  the  1st  October  2003,  CDSOA 
deposits  in  the  clearing  account  (i.e.  duty  revenue  available to  be  distributed to  affected 
domestic producers) were US$2.6 billion of  which US$1.4 billion was from the anti-dumping 
and countervailing cases on softwood lumber from Canada.  1 
The Byrd amendment was subject to criticism from its inception and when it passed into 
law President Clinton noted that it would 'provide select US industries with a subsidy above 
and beyond the protection level needed to  counteract foreign subsidies, while providing no 
1 Sources for this and the following paragraph are the World Trade Organisation, Trade Policy Review for 
the United States from 2001  and 2003, and various press releases from the European Commission from 2000 to 
2004. 
1 comparable subsidy to other US industries or to US consumers, who are forced to pay higher 
prices  on  industrial  inputs  or  consumer  goods  as  a  result  of the  anti-dumping  and 
countervailing  duties'.  The  European Union together  with  Australia,  Brazil,  Chile,  India, 
Japan,  Korea and  Thailand  complained to  the  World Trade  Organisation  about  the  Byrd 
amendment on the grounds that the  offsets  under the  CDSOA were an illegal response to 
dumping and subsidies. They also claimed that it would create a clear incentive to petition for 
anti-dumping or countervailing duties, and would make it more difficult for exporters subject 
to  anti-dumping or  countervailing investigations to  secure  an  undertaking.  A  WTO  Panel 
Report was issued in  September 2002  and,  following  an appeal by the US, the Appellate 
Body confirmed in January 2003  that the Byrd amendment was inconsistent with the Anti-
Dumping  Agreement,  the  Subsidies  and  Countervailing  Measures  Agreement,  the  GATT 
1994  and the  WTO  Agreement as  the  offsets  under the  CDSOA were  a  non-permissible 
action against dumping and subsidies. The US was given until 27th December 2003 to bring 
its  legislation into  conformity  with  its  WTO  obligations  but,  when it  failed  to  repeal the 
CDSOA,  the EU together with several other co-complainants applied in January 2004 for 
WTO authorisation to apply sanctions in the form of  higher import tariffs on US products. 
The criticisms of the Byrd amendment assume that the level of protection granted to the 
domestic  industry  would  be  unaffected  by  the  Byrd  amendment  as  the  anti-dumping  or 
countervailing duties would be defined by the regulations. However, economists would argue 
that the level of  protection is likely to be endogenous, and determined by the maximisation of 
some government welfare function by the policy-makers. It will be shown in this paper that if 
the policy-makers maximise a government welfare function that attaches a greater weight to 
the interests of the domestic industry then the Byrd amendment may result in a lower anti-
dumping  duty  and  higher  welfare  for  the  home  country.  The  reason  is  that  as  the  Byrd 
amendment gives the anti-dumping duty revenue to the domestic industry, the interests of  the 
2 domestic  industry  will  include  the  duty  revenue  as  well  as  profits  so  if the  government 
attaches a sufficiently large weight to the interests of the domestic industry then it may be 
optimal to lower the duty to increase the duty revenue. It is also shown that the anti-dumping 
duty is less likely to be prohibitive with the Byrd amendment. 
2. The Model 
Consider a two-country model with the home country variables labelled with a subscript 
one and the foreign country variables labelled with subscript two. In the domestic market of 
the  home  country,  there  are  ~ domestic  firms  that  compete  with  n)  foreign  firms  in  a 
Cournot oligopoly.  Each home  finn has  constant marginal  cost  c1  and  its  output  for  the 
domestic market is  ql  while each foreign firm has constant marginal cost  c2 and its exports 
to  the  home  country  are  q2'  Total  domestic  production  for  sale  in the  home  country  is 
Q1 = n1ql'  and  total  imports  of the  home  country  (exports  of the  foreign  country)  are 
Q2 = n2q2; therefore, total sales in the home market are  Q = Q1  + Q2 . Consumer preferences in 
the  home  country  are  quasi-linear,  and  demand  is  given  by  the  linear  inverse  demand 
function:  P = a - fJQ,  where  the  demand  parameters  are  positive:  a,f3 > 0,  a> c1  and 
a> c2 • The anti-dumping duty (specific tariff) set by the government in the home country is 
t  per unit imported. It is  assumed that markets are  segmented and that marginal costs are 
constant so the home market can be analysed independently of  the foreign market. 
The  ~ home  and  n2  foreign  firms  compete  as  Cournot oligopolists  in  the  domestic 
market of the home country taking the anti-dumping duty  set by the government as  given. 
With the Byrd amendment the anti-dumping duty revenue is  given to the domestic industry 
so the profits of  the ith domestic firm will include its share of  the anti-dumping duty revenue, 
3 which is  tQ2 / ~ if the duty is  distributed  equally  between all  domestic firms?  Thus,  the 
profits of  the ith domestic firm and the jth foreign firm are: 
without the Byrd amendment 
with the Byrd amendment  (1) 
In the Coumot equilibrium, each firm is setting its output to maximise its profits given 
the anti-dumping duty and the output of its competitors. Therefore, since  8Q2 /8ql = 0  in a 
Coumot equilibrium,  the presence of the  anti-dumping  duty  revenue  in the profits of the 
domestic firms  will not have any effect on the Coumot equilibrium outputs.  Assuming an 
interior  solution  where  the  home  country  is  supplied  by  both  domestic  production  and 
imports from the foreign industry, the first-order conditions for a Coumot equilibrium are: 
i=1, ...  ,~ 
8lT2)  I 
--=P+q  P -c =a-flQ-fJq  -c -t=O  8  2}  2  2}  2 
q2) 
(2) 
j =  1, .. .  ,n2 
Since all home firms have the same marginal cost then they will all produce the same 
output in  the  Coumot equilibrium so  qli = ql' and  since  all  foreign  firms  have  the  same 
marginal cost and face the same anti-dumping duty then they will all export the same output 
to the home market so  q2j = q2. Thus, with this symmetry, the first-order conditions (2) can 
be solved for the outputs ofthe domestic industry and the imports from the foreign industry: 
1  This assumption about the distribution of the anti-dumping duty  revenue  is  not important as  the duty 
revenue turns out not to affect the Cournot equilibrium outputs. 
4 Ql = (N ;1),8 [ a-(n2 +1)c1  +n2c2  +niJ 
(3) 
QJ = (  n2)  [a+~cl  -(nl +l)cJ -(~  +l)tJ 
- N+1,8  -
where  N  ==  ~  + n2  is the total number of  firms in the domestic market. Note that to sign some 
of  the later results it will be assumed that the quantity of imports is positive under free trade, 
Q 2 > 0  when  t = 0, which  implies  that  a +  ~Cl  - (nl +  1) c2 > o.  Substituting  the  Cournot 
equilibrium outputs (3) into the demand function gives the Cournot equilibrium price: 
(4) 
Although trade-lawyers may argue that the anti-dumping duties imposed on foreign firms 
are  simply calculated, in line with the regulations, as  being equal to the dumping or injury 
margin,  trade-economists  would argue  that  anti-dumping  duties  are  endogenous  and  that 
policy-makers  set  anti-dumping  duties to  maximise  some  government welfare  function.  It 
seems  plausible to  suggest  that the  policy-makers  are  maximising  a  government  welfare 
function that attaches more weight to the interests of  the domestic industry than to the general 
interests of the consumers and the taxpayers.  Such a government welfare function arises in 
the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model where special-interest groups lobby for protection 
by making political contributions to the government politicians who have a payoff function 
that  depends  upon  the  political  contributions  received  and  the  welfare  of the  country. 
Grossman and He1pman (1994) analyse this problem as a menu-auction as in Bernheim and 
Whinston (1986). They show that the outcome of this problem is equivalent to the outcome if 
the  government  was  maximising  a  welfare  function  that  attached  greater  weight  to  the 
special-interest groups than to the general consumer and taxpayer interests. Hence, it will be 
assumed that the government attaches more weight to the profits of  the domestic industry, the 
5 special-interest  group  in  this  case,  than  to  consumer  surplus  or  tax  revenue.  Thus,  the 
government in  the  home  country  chooses  its  anti-dumping  duty to  maximise  its  welfare, 
which is given by the weighted sum of consumer surplus, profits of  domestic firms (producer 
surplus) and tariff revenue: 
(5) 
The government attaches  a weight of one to  consumer surplus,  given by the  indirect 
utility function:  V ( p), a weight  /L > 1 on the profits of the domestic industry, and a weight 
Jl  on  duty revenue.  Without the  Byrd amendment, the  duty  revenue  goes  to  the  general 
taxpayers  and has  a  weight of one  (JI = 1),  whereas  with the  Byrd amendment the  duty 
revenue goes to the domestic industry so it has the same weight as the profits of  the domestic 
industry in the welfare of the government (Jl = /L).  Therefore, the Byrd amendment can be 
modelled as an increase from  JI = 1 to  Jl = /L , and by treating it as a continuous variable it is 
possible to analyse the problem using calculus. 
Assuming an interior solution where the domestic market is  supplied by both domestic 
production  and  imports  from  the  foreign  industry,  the  first-order  condition  for  the 
maximisation of  government welfare is: 
ac  ap  aQ[  ap  aQ2 
-=-Q-+/L(p-c )-+/LQ -+JlQ + Ilt-=O 
at  at  [at  [ at  2  r  at 
(6) 
The first term is the effect of  the tariff on consumer surplus, the second and third effects 
are the effect on the profits of  the domestic firms, and the fourth and fifth terms are the effect 
on tariff revenue. Using the Cournot equilibrium outputs (3) and price (4), and noting that the 
price-cost margin of  the home firms is:  P - c[ = j3q[ = j3QJn[, the first-order condition can be 
re-written as: 
6 (7) 
Further  differentiation  yields  the  second-order  condition  for  the  maximisation  of 
government welfare: 
(8) 
The  second-order  condition will  be  satisfied provided the  term  in  square  brackets  is 
positive, and this will be the case if the weight on the profits of the domestic industry is  not 
too large:  A < AS  == [2( ~  + 1)( N + 1) Jl-n2 J/2~n2  , which implies that A < 11/2  in the case of 
a duopoly (~  = n2 = 1 ) without the Byrd amendment,  Jl = 1.3 The second-order condition will 
always be satisfied with the Byrd amendment when the weight on tariff revenue is the same 
as the weight on the profits of the domestic industry (Jl = A ) as the term in square brackets 
will be positive:  2.,1,( n1 + 1)2 + (2A -1)n2 > O. 
The  optimum  anti-dumping  duty  (specific  tariff)  for  the  government  IS  obtained  by 
setting the expression in square brackets in (7) equal to zero and rearranging: 
(9) 
Since  the  outputs  of the  domestic  and  foreign  industry  are  assumed  to  be  positive 
quantities, the optimum anti-dumping duty for the government is unambiguously positive, but 
it is  interesting to consider how it depends upon the weight that the government puts on the 
profits  of the  domestic  industry.  The  effect  of the  weight  attached to  the  profits  of the 
3  The  profits  of the  domestic  industry  are  increasing  and  convex  in  the  anti-dumping  duty  so  if the 
government puts a large weight on the profits of the domestic industty then the welfare of the government will 
7 domestic  industry  on  the  optimum  anti-dumping  duty  can  be  assessed  by  totally 
differentiating the first-order condition for welfare maximisation (7), which yields: 
where  (10) 
The denominator is  the second-order condition for  welfare maximisation (8), which is 
negative.  Thus, the effect of an increase in the weight that the government attaches to  the 
profits of  the domestic industry in its welfare function is: 
(11) 
As one would expect, the greater the weight that the govermnent attaches to the profits of 
the domestic industry then the larger will be the optimum anti-dumping duty.  This leads to 
the following proposition: 
Proposition  1:  The  optimum  anti-dumping  duty  (specific  tarifJ)  is  positive,  and 
increasing in the weight on the profits of  the domestic industry in the welfare fimction of  the 
government. 
If f.1 = A = 1 then optimum anti-dumping duty formula would be the same as the optimum 
tariff in  Brander and Spencer (1984a and b), where the tariff improves welfare by shifting 
profits from foreign firms to  domestic firms  and by extracting rent from the foreign firms. 
When the government puts a weight greater than one on the profits of the domestic industry 
then the  anti-dumping duty will be  larger than the  optimum tariff in  Brander and Spencer 
(1984a and b).  Using a general demand function, Brander and Spencer (1984a and b)  show 
that the optimum tariff is  positive unless demand is extremely convex.  However, when the 
be convex in the anti-dumping duty.  Then, the optimum anti-dumping duty will be prohibitive so imports will 
be equal to zero. The case of prohibitive duties will be analysed explicitly in section five. 
8 government attaches a weight greater than one to the profits of  the domestic industry then the 
anti-dumping duty is more likely to be positive. 
3. Anti-dumping Duties and the Byrd Amendment 
Having  derived  the  optimum  anti-dumping  duty  of the  government,  one  can  now 
consider how the Byrd amendment affects the optimum anti-dumping duty.  With the Byrd 
amendment, the duty revenue is  distributed to  the domestic  industry so  the  firms  are now 
concerned  about  duty revenue  as  well as  their profits  and  therefore  the  government  will 
attach the same weight to duty revenue as to the profits of the domestic industry. Thus, the 
Byrd amendment can be represented by an increase in the weight on duty revenue from  j.1 = 1 
to  j.1 =  A  in the welfare function of the government. The effect of the Byrd amendment can 
be derived by looking at the comparative static results for  how the optimum anti-dumping 
duty is affected by an increase in the weight on duty revenue. Totally differentiating the first-
order condition for the maximisation of  government welfare (7) and solving yields: 
(12) 
The  denominator  is  the  second-order  condition  for  the  maximisation  of government 
welfare (8)  and hence is  negative.  Evaluating the second-order derivative in the numerator 
yields: 
82G  1 
8j.18t = (N +l)P[(N  +1)PQ2  -n2(~  +l)tJ 
(13) 
= (  n2)  (Q-2AQl) 
N+lj.1 
9 The second expression is obtained by substituting the optimum anti-dumping duty into 
the first expression. Thus, the effect of the Byrd amendment on the optimum anti-dumping 
duty is: 
dt*  =  f3(N +1)[Q-2AQl] 
dJi  Ji[2(nl+1)(N +1)Ji-2n1n2A-nJ 
(14) 
The  sign  of the  expreSSiOn  III square  brackets  in  the  denominator  is  positive  if the 
second-order conditions are  satisfied while the term in square brackets in the numerator is 
negative  if the  weight  on  the  profits  of the  domestic  industry  exceeds  a  critical  value: 
A*  ==Q/2Ql =1/2d, where  d ==Ql/Q  is the market share of the domestic industry. Note that 
if  the market share of  the domestic industry is greater than one-half then the critical weight is 
less than one so  dt'  / d Ji  is negative for any  A:2: 1. If A > A  * the optimum anti-dumping duty 
will decrease as  a result of the Byrd amendment (an increase in  Ji), and this leads to the 
following proposition: 
Proposition  2:  The  Byrd amendment (an  increase  in  Ji)  will result in  a  lower anti-
dumping duty if  the weight on the profits of  the domestic industry in the government welfare 
function exceeds the critical value A  *  == 1/2d . 
To  understand this  result one has  to  appreciate that in  a  Coumot oligopoly model,  in 
contrast to  a  model  with perfect-competition,  optimum-welfare tariff the  may  exceed the 
maximum-revenue  tariff.  In  a  Coumot  duopoly  model,  Collie  (1991)  showed  that  the 
optimum welfare tariff would exceed the maximum revenue tariff if both firms had the same 
marginal costs and, generally, this would be the case unless the foreign firm had a sufficiently 
large cost advantage. When the govemment attaches a weight greater than one on the profits 
of the  domestic  industry then  it  is  even  more  likely that the  optimum anti-dumping  duty 
exceeds the duty that maximises duty revenue. Then, if there is an increase in the weight that 
10 the government attaches  to  duty  revenue then this  will lead the government to  reduce  its 
optimum anti-dumping duty as this will increase duty revenue. Proposition two shows that if 
the weight that the government attaches to the profits of the domestic industry is sufficiently 
large,  A > A  * ,  then the optimum anti-dumping duty will exceed the duty that maximises duty 
revenue and the Byrd amendment will lead to a reduction in the anti-dumping duty. Since the 
critical value of the weight is  less than one if the market share of the domestic industry is 
larger than one-half, this would seem to be more than a remote theoretical possibility. 
The critical value of the weight on the profits of the domestic industry is  obviously an 
important factor in this analysis, and therefore the critical value will be investigated in some 
detail.  The critical value is  inversely related to  the market share of the domestic industry, 
which is  an endogenous variable depending upon the number of domestic and foreign firms 
and their costs. It is possible to solve the model explicitly and to obtain an explicit solution 
for the critical weight: 
A  * __  1_ .  {  2~  (N +  1) + n2  }  a - ~  (2nj + n2  + 2) cj  - n2 (~  +  1) c2 
- 2~  (2~  +n2 +2)a-{~(n2  +2)+2(n2 +1)}cj  +n2(~  +1)c2 
(15) 
This expression is rather complicated, but when there is a duopoly and the firms have the 
same  marginal  cost  the  critical  value  of the  weight  is  less  than  one,  A  * = 7/10.  The 
comparative static results for the critical value of the weight on the profits of the domestic 
industry can be obtained by differentiating (15) with respect to the costs and the number of 
firms: 
11 a"f =  -(~+1)2n2(N+l)(a-cl)<O 
aC2  Ll 
(16) 
All have the expected sign: an increase in the costs of the home firms, a decrease in the 
costs of the foreign firms, and an increase in the number of foreign firms will all reduce the 
market share of  the domestic industry and result in a consequent increase in the critical value 
of  the weight. In general, the effect of an increase in the number of home firms is ambiguous 
but will increase the critical value of the weight if home and foreign firms  have the same 
costs. The ambiguity is due to the fact that the direct effect of the increase in the number of 
home firms is to increase the market share of the domestic industry, but the indirect effect is 
to  reduce the price-cost margin of the home firms  and thereby to reduce the optimum anti-
dumping duty, which will decrease the market share of the domestic industry.  The critical 
value of  the weight will be relatively large if  there are many foreign firms with low costs and 
a few home firms with high costs, and it may be that this case it the most relevant for anti-
dumping cases.  However, it  should be pointed out that there are  only a few  anti-dumping 
cases where the market-share of  the domestic industry is less than one-half and in these cases 
the critical value ofthe weight will be less than one so proposition two will hold.4 
4 It should be stressed that the relevant market-share of the domestic industry is the market-share with the 
anti-dumping duty and not the market-share under free  trade as  the results were evaluated with the optimum 
anti-dumping duty. 
12 4. Welfare and the Byrd Amendment 
As the optimum anti-dumping duty is  larger than the optimum-welfare tariff, it may be 
conjectured that if  the Byrd amendment results in a lower anti-dumping dumping duty then it 
will increase the welfare of  the home country. To ascertain whether this conjecture is correct, 
one  has  to  analyse  how the  welfare  of the  home  country  is  affected  by  changes  in  the 
optimum anti-dumping duty as  a result of the Byrd amendment.  The welfare of the home 
country (as opposed to the welfare of the government) is defined as the unweighted sum of 
consumer surplus, producer surplus and government revenue. 
w  = V ( P ) + (  P - c1 ) Q1 + tQ2  (17) 
As the  government is  setting the  anti-dumping duty to  maximise its welfare,  G, it  is 
advantageous to  re-write  the  welfare  of the  country  in terms  of government welfare.  By 
comparing (5) and (17) it can be seen that the welfare of  the country can be written as: 
W = G - (  A -1) (  P - c1 ) Q1 + (f1 -1)  tQ2  (18) 
To  evaluate  the  effect  of the  Byrd  amendment  on  the  welfare  of the  home  country 
differentiate (18) with respect to  f1, while noting that  aGjat = 0  since the optimum anti-
dumping duty maximises government welfare (5) and also that aG j a  f1 = tQ2'  This yields the 
following: 
(19) 
Using the comparative static results from (3) and (4) this can be simplified to: 
(20) 
Then, substituting the optimal anti-dumping duty (9) into (20) yields: 
13 (21) 
Since  1:::; Jl :::;"l  and the outputs of the domestic and foreign industries are positive, the 
term in square brackets is positive so the overall sign is the opposite to the effect on the tariff 
of  an increase in the weight on the profits of  the domestic industry,  dt* / d Jl . Therefore, if  the 
Byrd amendment results in a lower anti-dumping duty then the welfare of the home country 
will increase as a result. This leads to the following proposition: 
Proposition 3: if  "l >"l*  == 1/2d then the Byrd amendment (an  increase in  Jl) will result 
in a lower anti-dumping duty and higher welfare for the home country. 
The  explanation  is  that when the  government puts  a weight greater than one  on the 
profits  of the  domestic  industry  then  the  optimum  anti-dumping  duty  is  larger  than  the 
optimum-welfare tariff for the home country so if  the Byrd amendment leads to a lower anti-
dumping duty then it will increase the welfare of the home country. Conversely, if the Byrd 
amendment leads to a higher anti-dumping duty then it will decrease the welfare of  the home 
country. 
5. Prohibitive Anti-Dumping Duties and the Byrd amendment 
The analysis in sections three and four assumed an interior solution where the domestic 
market in the home country was supplied by both domestic production and imports from the 
foreign  industry.  However,  it  is  possible  that  the  optimum  anti-dumping  duty  will  be 
prohibitive and result in zero imports from the foreign industry especially if the weight that 
the  government  attaches  to  the  profits  of the  domestic  industry  is  large.  Therefore,  the 
possibility of  a boundary solution where the anti-dumping duty is prohibitive and there are no 
14 imports will be considered in this section. From (3), the exports of  the foreign industry to the 
home country will be equal to zero, Q) = 0, if  the anti-dumping duty set by the government is 
larger than the prohibitive duty: 
(22) 
There will be a boundary solution where the optimum anti-dumping duty is prohibitive if 
government  welfare  is  increasing  when  evaluated  at  the  prohibitive  duty,  t = tP ,  which 
implies that imports are  equal to  zero,  Q2 = o.  This will be the case if the welfare of the 
government is convex so that the second-order conditions are not satisfied,  A > AS, or it may 
happen if  the welfare of the government is concave. Using (7), the derivative of government 
welfare evaluated at the prohibitive anti-dumping duty is: 
(23) 
Using (3) and (22), it can be shown that this will be positive if  the weight on the profits 
ofthe domestic industry is larger than the prohibitive weight AP ,  which is defined as: 
(24) 
Without the  Byrd amendment,  Jl = 1,  when  firms  have  the  same  marginal  costs  the 
prohibitive weight is:  A; = (2nl + 1) /2n1 '  whereas  with the Byrd amendment, Jl = A, it  is: 
A: =  ~  / (~ -1), which is higher than without the Byrd amendment,  A: > A;. In general, it 
can be seen that the critical value is increasing in the weight on duty revenue,  d A  P / d Jl > 0 , 
so  the  critical  value  will  be  higher  with  the  Byrd  amendment  than  without  the  Byrd 
amendment. This leads to the following proposition: 
15 Proposition 4:  The  Byrd amendment (an  increase in  Ji) reduces the prohibitive weight 
AP  and makes it less likely that the optimum anti-dumping duty wiU be prohibitive. 
Thus, the optimum anti-dumping duty is more likely to be prohibitive without the Byrd 
amendment than with the Byrd amendment.  Also,  since the market-share of the  domestic 
industry is  100% with a prohibitive anti-dumping duty, the critical value of  the weight on the 
profits of the domestic industry is  one-half,  A  * =  ~, so proposition three implies that if the 
Byrd amendment leads to the anti-duty being reduced to below the prohibitive rate then it 
will lead to higher welfare. 
6.  Conclusions 
It  has been shown that the Byrd amendment can result in a lower anti-dumping duty and 
higher welfare for the home country if  the weight that the government attaches to the interests 
of the  domestic  industry  is  sufficiently  large.  The  reason  is  that  when the  government 
attaches a sufficiently large weight to the interests of  the domestic industry then the optimum 
anti-dumping duty will exceed the maximum revenue tariff so the government can increase 
duty revenue, which goes to the domestic industry, by reducing the optimum anti-dumping 
duty. This increases welfare of  the home country by shifting the optimum anti-dumping duty 
closer to the optimum-welfare tariff. Note that if  the Byrd amendment results in a lower anti-
dumping duty, it will also result in higher welfare for the foreign country. 
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